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I. Introduction
The issue of arbitrability has been intensively discussed
in the arbitration community and often generates both
scholarly and professionals’ debates.
Arbitrability is about ‘‘determining which types of dispute
may be resolved by arbitration and which belongs exclu-
sively to the domain of the courts.’’1 What can or cannot
be resolved through arbitration, besides its technical,
strictly legal aspects, also demonstrates the scale of
values and the attitude of a state with respect to parti-
cular disputes, which might vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. The underlying interests behind these
‘‘arbitrate or not considerations’’ might be diverse.
Such an interest and value to protect can be political,
social, economic and the combination of these. Typical
examples for these types of excluded disputes are
patents and trademarks, family disputes, antitrust and
competition law, marriage actions, and administrative
lawsuits. The aim of the legislator in power in any
jurisdiction should be to keep the balance between
the domestic importance of reserving matters associated
with public interest to the courts and fostering trade
and commerce, including domestic and international.2
Unfortunately, Hungary has adopted two laws, which
seem to have failed to keep this balance.
II. Is Arbitration Involving State-Owned
Assets Indeed Being Outlawed?
As a starting point, we introduce the problematic provi-
sions of the new laws for the purpose of latter reference
and detailed discussion.
Section 17 (3) of Act CXCVI of 2011 on National
Assets (‘‘National Assets Act’’):3
‘‘In civil law contracts related to national assets located
within the territory encompassed by the boarders of Hun-
gary, the person entitled to dispose of national assets may
exclusively prescribe, the Hungarian language as governing
language, the Hungarian law as governing law and the
jurisdiction of Hungarian courts (not including arbitra-
tion) in the case of a dispute. The person entitled to dispose
of national assets may not stipulate arbitration proceedings
in respect of disputes arising out of such contract.’’
The above provision of the National Assets Act suggests
that parties, including foreign investors, are prevented
from validly incorporating arbitration clauses into their
agreements if the agreement is related to national assets
located in the territory of Hungary.
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Section 17 (1) of the National Assets Act provides a
time frame for the application of the above provision:
‘‘The provisions of this act have no effect on rights and
obligations obtained validly and in good faith before com-
ing into force of this act. With the exception of (. . .) the
extension of the term of an agreement — which was con-
cluded before this act came into force — after this act has
come into force, is considered to be a new legal relationship,
excluding cases (. . .).’’
Section 17 entered into force on 1 January 2012 (add-
ing that the discussed section 17 (1) was amended in 30
July 30 2012 with the exceptions).
National assets due to section 1 (2) of the National
Assets Act are described as follows:
a) assets in the exclusive ownership of the state or a
local municipality,
b) assets that do not fall within the scope of para-
graph a) above, and are owned by the state or a
local municipality,
c) financial assets owned by the state or a local muni-
cipality, as well as corporate shares held by the state
or a local municipality,
d) any right representing assets held by the state or a
local municipality, which right is specified by law
as a right representing assets
e) the air space above the area enclosed by the borders
of Hungary,
f) emission reduction units and air transport emis-
sion reduction units as specified under the Act on
the trade of emission reduction units, and the
Kyoto units, as specified under the Act on the
implementation framework for the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and its Kyoto Protocol,
g) assets included among the cultural assets registered
in the collection of public collections maintained
by the state or a local municipality (museums,
archives, image and sound archives operating as
public collections and libraries) (. . .),
h) archeological finds,
i) national data assets as specified under the act on
the increased protection of state registers qualifying
as national data assets.
Although according to s. 2 of the National Assets Act,
particular items, which otherwise would be treated as
national assets, are excluded:
a) the financial assets of the organs and persons
included within the scope of state finances,
b) receivables and payment obligations,
c) the financial assets of the social security system and
separate state funds, and
d) the national data assets as specified in Section 1 (2)
i ) subject to the provisions under Section 16 (4).
The modified section 4 of Act LXXI of 1994 on Arbi-
tration (‘‘Arbitration Act’’):4
‘‘The proceedings governed in (. . .) - whether the ad hoc or
permanent arbitration tribunal is seated inside or outside
of Hungary -, or any cases where the subject-matter of the
dispute is a national asset by definition of Act CXCVI of
2011 on National Assets, situated in an area within the
boundaries of Hungary, including the rights, claims and
privileges related to such asset, furthermore, (. . . )may not
be settled by arbitration.’’
The above restriction was incorporated into the Arbi-
tration Act in 2012 and entered into force on 13 June
2012.
III. Theoretical Concerns — Practical
Problems
Legal scholars, — including the chairman5 of the Arbi-
tration Court Attached to the Hungarian Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, which is the leading arbitra-
tion institution in Hungary — and arbitration profes-
sionals have expressed their concerns with respect to the
above-described legislation.6
The concerns and criticism can be summarised as fol-
lows: (i) the purpose of protecting national assets
involved in disputes can be achieved with more efficient
and already existing means, such as deciding about dis-
pute resolution methods at the time of conclusion of
the contact on a case and situation specific basis, (ii)
violation of multilateral international conventions, as
well as bilateral investment treaties (iii) it is not compa-
tible with the law of the European Union and respective
international practice, (iv) violation of constitutional
provisions, (v) it is a false perception that skipping
arbitration would automatically lead to the jurisdiction
of Hungarian courts, since even without any concrete
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stipulation, the application of effective legislation
would establish in many cases the jurisdiction of foreign
courts anyway, (vi) harmful effect on Hungary’s role
and how Hungary is viewed in the arena of interna-
tional trade, commercial relationships, especially in the
area of investments.7
In the following, we discuss the reaction of the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court (‘‘Constitutional Court’’)
regarding the above-described legislation prohibiting
arbitration in disputes involving national assets, which
can be criticised for rejecting (and not being bold
enough to chose the opposite path, which nevertheless
is not a surprise, taking into account that by today, the
overwhelming majority of the Constitutional Court
judges are appointees of the current government, typi-
cally expressing no or hardly any criticism towards leg-
islation initiated by their appointers) the applications’
to annul the introduced provisions and tolerate provi-
sions, which on a certain level seem to be in contrast
with the Hungarian Fundamental Law, but at least it
provides some explanation, while pointing out that
how attractive Hungary will be for foreign investors
or reputational issues are not for the Constitutional
Court to decide on or take into account.
The exclusion of arbitration with respect to matters
concerning items of national assets located in the terri-
tory of Hungary has been challenged before the Con-
stitutional Court in two applications.8
The officer in charge of fundamental rights in Hungary,
whose application actually generated the first and also
the most detailed and responsive decision9 of the Con-
stitutional Court, alleged that due to the modification
to the Arbitration Act, its section 4 and the section 17
(3) of the National Assets Act are not in conformity
with the Hungarian Fundamental Law10 and interna-
tional treaties signed by Hungary due to outlawing arbi-
tration in national assets related disputes. In addition,
the applicant also argues that the legislation violates the
principle of legal certainty due to the retrospective — at
least seemingly retrospective — application of provision
of the Arbitration Act, which may lead to the unenfor-
ceability of arbitration agreements concluded before 13
June 2012. We are going to discuss the second allega-
tion in the next subsection, while below, we introduce
the most critical points of the violation of international
treaties and commitments and the answers provided by
the Constitutional Court.11
As we have mentioned above, the incompatibility of the
discussed provisions with Hungary’s international com-
mitments in the field of international commercial arbi-
tration and investment treaty arbitration have been
addressed by the Hungarian arbitration community.
We discuss the violation of these commitments, by
shortly summarising the allegations of the officer in
charge of fundamental rights.
Firstly, it seems Hungary has violated the European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration
dated 21 April 1961 (‘‘Geneva Convention’’), which was
signed by Hungary on 9 October 1963. The violation
of the Geneva Convention has occurred since Hungary,
at the time of singing, failed to make any declaration,
reservation which otherwise would enable Hungary to
preclude the ‘‘legal persons of public law’’ to submit their
disputes to arbitration. In order to understand the nat-
ure of this violation, it is important to know that in
accordance with Article II of the Geneva Convention,
such a declaration on limitation may not occur after the
signature, ratification, or accession of a contracting state
to the Geneva Convention.12 Based on that, Hungary
has missed the appropriate moment for making a
declaration of limitation in order to ensure that the
‘‘legal persons of public law’’ are outlawed from the
arena of arbitration. With respect to that, Kecskés Lás-
zló and Tilk Péter argues that in case Hungary had
aimed to pursue a lawful procedure, then the Geneva
Convention should have been denounced since Hun-
gary decided to limit the scope of application of the
convention or section 17 (3) of the National Assets
Act should have been overruled since the current situa-
tion is contrary to the Hungarian Fundamental Law.13
Regarding the Geneva Convention the Constitutional
Court held that if it might be possible that an overlap
between the scope of the Geneva Convention and the
scope of the National Assets Act occurs, then it is the
responsibility of the government to exclude the possi-
bility of conflict with the discussed convention through
termination or termination followed by joining it again
with the inclusion of the limitations.
Secondly, the limitations are not compatible with the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards dated 10 June 1958 (‘‘New
York Convention’’), which came into force in Hungary
on 3 June 1962, either. According to Article II.1 of the
New York Convention, ‘‘Each Contracting State shall
recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
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undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences
which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual
or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration.’’14 According to the opinion of Kecskés and
Tilk, the ‘‘concerning a subject matter capable of settle-
ment by arbitration’’ cannot be interpreted as the equiva-
lent of ‘‘if the act renders it possible.’’ Hence, an
interpretation, which would enable the internal legis-
lation to decide about that, is not correct. Such an
interpretation would narrow the meaning of Article
Q (1)-(2) of the Hungarian Fundamental Act and in
terms of its consequences, it would render relative the
role and priority of international treaties and conven-
tions, which are otherwise ensured by the Hungarian
Fundamental Act.15
As a consequence, section 4 of the Arbitration Act and
section 17 (3) of the National Assets Act, by prohibiting
such arbitration agreements and proceedings, violate
the New York Convention. We add that according to
Article V paragraph 2 (a) of the New York Convention,
‘‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may
also be refused if the competent authority in the county
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that the
subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement
by arbitration under the law of that county.’’16 This pro-
vision of the New York Convention suggests that Hun-
garian state courts may refuse the recognition and
enforcement of an award rendered in violation of the
discussed laws.17
The Constitutional Court reflected to this argument of
the officer in charge of fundamental rights by arguing
that the New York Convention on the one hand,
focuses on arbitral awards and the accused provisions,
such as section 17 (3) of the National Assets Act and
section 4 of the Arbitration Act have nothing to do with
arbitral awards. On the other hand, the Constitutional
Court emphasized that with respect to arbitration
agreements already concluded, section 17 (1) provides
enough protection.
Finally, the limitations have had an influence on invest-
ment arbitration, as well. Hungary has joined the Con-
vention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of other States dated 18
March 1965 (‘‘Washington Convention’’). The Wash-
ington Convention came into force in Hungary on 6
March 1987. Due to Article 25 (1) of the Washington
Convention, ‘‘(. . .) When the parties have given their
consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilater-
ally.’’18 As a result, such a unilateral kind of ‘‘modifica-
tion’’ which has occurred due to section 17 (3) of the
National Assets Act is not possible. Adding that Hun-
gary may not rely on Article 25 (4) of the Washington
Convention, either ‘‘Any Contracting State may, at the
time of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Con-
vention or at any time thereafter, notify the Centre of the
class or classes of disputes which it would or would not
consider submitting to the jurisdiction of the Centre. The
Secretary-General shall forthwith transmit such notifica-
tion to all Contracting States. Such notification shall not
constitute the consent required by paragraph (1).’’
Hungary, according to our knowledge, has not notified
the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (‘‘ICSID’’), more precisely its Secretary Gen-
eral, who would notify immediately the other contract-
ing states about any class or classes of disputes which the
state would not consider submitting to the jurisdiction
of the center. Nevertheless, even in the case of a noti-
fication, the already granted consent cannot be limited
or withdrawn.19 As a consequence, any consent already
given to ICSID arbitration, by Hungary or by any of its
public authorities — irrespectively of its basis, such as
arbitration agreement, law, bilateral investment treaty
(‘‘BIT’’) — shall be treated as irrevocable.20 The Con-
stitutional Court has reached the conclusion that
neither the Arbitration Act, nor section 17 (3) of the
National Assets Act affect and govern disputes between
contracting states (as sovereign states) of BITs, since
these types of disputes are resolved under the respective
arbitration provisions of a BIT, which are not affected
by the restrictions.21
The Constitutional Court with respect to settlement of
investment disputes between a contracting state and an
investor of the other contracting state has reached the
conclusion that section 17 (1) of the National Assets
Act is applicable not only to private law agreements, but
also to international commercial or investment agree-
ments, effective on 1 January 2012, which were con-
cluded between Hungarian state entities and investors.
This means that section 17 (3) of the National Assets
Act and section 4 of the Arbitration Act have no effect
on rights and obligations obtained validly and in good
faith before 1 January 2012. Nevertheless, the Consti-
tutional Court noted that it is the task of the govern-
ment to ensure that concerned treaties are renegotiated
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in due time if it is reasonable and necessary to preserve
such legal relationships. Adding that if the other con-
tacting state is not willing to do so, then the given treaty
shall be terminated.
We eliminate the detailed discussion about the second
constitutional claim, in which the challenged provision
was section 4 of the Arbitration Act, since the Consti-
tutional Court had found that it had already decided
the issues revealed in the above application.22
Building on and taking into consideration the findings
of the Constitutional Court, the Economic Division of
the Metropolitan Court, in its decision rejected a chal-
lenge against an order which had been rendered under
the rules of the Arbitration Court attached to the
Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
This order stipulates that the arbitral tribunal has jur-
isdiction based on the arbitration provision of the dis-
cussed BIT.23 The court has pointed out that due to s.
17 (1) of the National Assets Act, it is possible to arbi-
trate a dispute even if it is related to national assets —
adding that the individual arbitration agreement was
based on international treaty, was concluded before
the enactment of the new laws. Since according to
section 17 (1), rights and obligations obtained validly
and in good faith are not affected, and an arbitration
agreement, which was concluded before 13 June 2012
forms rights and obligations obtained validly and in
good faith and is ‘‘protected’’ from the limitation
even if the arbitration proceeding is initiated after 13
June 2012.
For the time being, there have been seven pending cases
against Hungary before the ICSID, five of these were
initiated after the discussed laws came into force and
according to our knowledge, none of them was sub-
ject to a plea for lack of jurisdiction based on the new
legislation.24 As a result, contrary to the established
theoretical concerns, as for the moment, only limited
amount of practice is available and reflected. Neverthe-
less, the amount of pending cases suggests that several
investors have initiated arbitration proceedings against
Hungary, and this restriction will most probably not
reduce the amount of cases initiated against Hungary.
Exactly the opposite, it may lead to the increase of
establishing damages claims initiated by foreign inves-
tors because of finding themselves before Hungarian
courts instead of arbitration in accordance with the BIT.
IV. Interpretational Difficulties
The relevant provisions of the National Assets Act,
as well as the Arbitration Act have raised many ques-
tions in terms of their actual application and interpreta-
tion. Here, we draw the attention to only some of these
issues.
Firstly, the concept of national assets, even though it
was introduced more than two years ago, still can be
considered as ‘‘new,’’ at least due to lacking enough
directly relevant court decisions and interpretation,
we do not have enough guidelines. As a result, at the
time of considering arbitration as a dispute resolution
method, the parties contracting (including the exten-
sion of the term of an already concluded contract) with
state or local government need to analyse carefully the
subject matter of the contract and ignore arbitration if
it seems that the subject matter falls into the national
assets limitation.
The limitations clarified under section 2 of the National
Assets Act also raise some questions. We agree with the
Hungarian arbitration professional, who argues that the
receivables and payment obligation exception, without
any further clarification, suggests that disputes exclu-
sively about receivables and payment obligations, such
as compensation claim, can be arbitrated.25 But what is
the procedure to follow in the case of those disputes,
which, besides the payment obligation element, include
other types of claims? We also share the opinion that
based on a strict literal interpretation of the above
exception, it would be possible to conclude a separate
arbitration agreement to the cash claim, then resolve the
other claims at the court. Nevertheless, in practice it is
more likely that a governmental or local body would
not agree to an arbitration agreement which would
diverse (from their point of view) an important part
of the dispute to arbitration while other issues would
be litigated.26
Finally, the wording of the relevant provisions of the
National Assets Act is rather parallel than in harmony
with the respective provisions of the Arbitration Act.
On the one hand, the National Assets Act stipulates
that its arbitration provisions are applicable only to
agreements concluded after 1 January 2012. As a con-
sequence, the above clarified set of requirements such
as: Hungarian language, Hungarian law and exclusive
jurisdiction of Hungarian courts to the resolution of
disputes concerning items of national assets are not
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applicable to agreements, including arbitration agree-
ments, concluded before 1 January 2012. Hence such
arbitration agreements in theory would remain valid
and fall outside the scope of the limitation.
On the other hand, the above introduced section 4 of
the Arbitration Act is applicable to procedures com-
menced on or after 13 June 2012. It is a mandatory
provision; as a consequence, a dispute regarding items
of national assets, contrary to an existing arbitration
agreement, cannot be arbitrated after 13 June 2012.
Contrary to this incompatibility, according to an arbi-
tration professional, in the event of an arbitration pro-
ceeding commenced after 13 June 2012, an arbitral
tribunal can still find that it has jurisdiction in accor-
dance with the well-established rule that states and
state-owned entities cannot rely on their own law to
challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement into
which they unreservedly entered. We must add that it is
still uncertain how Hungarian courts would handle at
the enforcement stage, as well as the annulment stage an
award, which is the outcome of such an arbitration.27
We believe that in principle, arbitration agreements
concluded before that date should not be affected,
but this is yet to be seen.
In our point of view, even though this would be favor-
able and rational, the wording of section 4 of the Arbi-
tration Act suggests a different interpretation. The
legislator has used the term proceedings, and even
though this term is clear, the consequences might be
unintentional and confusing. It usually happens that
an arbitration agreement is concluded far before an
actual arbitration proceeding based on an already for-
mulated arbitration agreement would take place in
order to resolve a dispute arising out of and in connec-
tion with a particular contract. For this reason, it means
that irrespective from the fact that the arbitration agree-
ment was concluded before 13 June 2012, if the arbi-
tration proceeding is commenced after that date, then
the disputants are denied from arbitration as a method
of dispute resolution since such an arbitration agree-
ment is unenforceable.
Actually this discrepancy, both between the text and the
meaning of the discussed provisions of the acts, was
directly pointed out and reflected by the officer in
charge of fundamental rights in the discussed constitu-
tional court decision.28 We intentionally avoid the
term ‘‘discussed’’ since the Constitutional Court has
unfortunately neglected to give an explanation or dis-
solve this controversy. Instead, it stated that the provi-
sions of the National Assets Act both sections 17. (1)
and (3) and the respective provision of the Arbitration
Act shall be interpreted and applied jointly and in con-
formity with each other. Adding that the Constitu-
tional Court went even further and argued that —
due to the fact that the respective provision of the
Arbitration Act has been formulated considering
section 17 (3) of the National Assets Act — there is a
textual similarity and content uniformity between those
provisions. It may well be the case that the Arbitration
Act was amended in order to ensure a coherent legisla-
tive framework for the protection of the items of
national asset, nevertheless, we still argue that consider-
ing the currently effective provisions, there is definitely
non-conformity between their content, which indeed
jeopardises the principle of certainty.
V. Hungary’s Position In International Com-
mercial Relationships In View Of The
Limitations
Finally, with respect to the effect on Hungary’s reputa-
tion in international trade and commercial relation-
ships, it is important to emphasise that since in
international commercial dispute resolution, arbitra-
tion is rather the rule than the exception, outlawing
arbitrations sends the wrong message that Hungary
does not care about this practice anymore. We use
the term ‘‘anymore’’ since until this backward looking
and unreasonable legislation, Hungary’s arbitration leg-
islation and practice has been in harmony with inter-
national trends. This is also demonstrated by the fact
that the Arbitration Act was entirely in accordance with
the UNCITRAL Modal Law.
The above introduced rules, limiting rather than pro-
moting arbitration, are likely to have a negative effect
on foreign investors, more precisely on their investment
incentives. It sounds like a cliché, but it is still true that
foreign investors do not want to find themselves in
front of a national court, especially taking into account
how many new judges have been appointed by the
reigning right-wing government recently in Hungary.
It is not an exaggeration to argue that — and this again,
comes from practice — for an investor, a negotiated
dispute resolution clause is critical enough to decide
about skipping the transaction if its participation in
the decision-making on the applicable dispute resolu-
tion method is entirely eliminated.
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Unfortunately Hungary has failed to strike the balance
between protecting public interest, domain and foster-
ing an investor friendly legislative environment. We
believe that the described limitations are not justified,
and even if they were justified under given circum-
stances, these laws are not in accordance with the aim
to achieve.
Reflecting to the title of the present article, it seems that
it is not only about the protection of national assets, but
about emphasising that courts are in a better position
and more capable of resolving disputes only because
they are related to national assets.
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IV Act on Civil Code (1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári
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bı́rók Könyve (Budapest, HVG-ORAC 2012) 212-230.
8. Constitutional Court decision 14/2013 (VI.17.) (AB
határozat); Constitutional Court injunction 3139/
2013 (VII. 2) (AB végzés).
9. Ibid.
10. Hungarian Fundamental Law (Alaptörvény).
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ICSID Case No. ARB/12/3, Registered (January 18
2012), Dan Cake (Portugal) S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/9, Registered (April 19, 2012),
Edenred S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/
13/21, Registered (September 09 2013), Le Chèque
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